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As the end of the year 2020 approached, the Vice-President of the French Conseil
d’État Bruno Lasserre commented on one line of the case-law that appeared in
the pandemic year: urgent application judges had to decide on the legality of rules
found in press-releases and interviews by first deciphering legal rules and their
hierarchy from those texts. This reflected exactly my experience as a practitioner in
2020 Russia: advising a client having weighed whether a blog of the Speaker of the
Moscow City Duma carried more authority than a televised interview of the Moscow
Mayor.
It did not necessarily have to be that way. Russia faced the beginning of the
pandemic with relevant legislation in force, which will be described first below. Then
I will elaborate on how the existing laws, were not applied by the executive which
made ways around the legislation. The results of legislative reforms and executive
action include ever more curbed human rights, and a rushed constitutional reform
entrenching Putin’s rule. Little hope remains for a practitioner in the field of public
law, but I will finally attempt to show that the “zeroisation” has not yet been total.
A Brief Overview of Russian Emergency Legislation
Article 56 of the 1993 Russian Constitution allows restrictions on human rights to be
enacted in a state of emergency (chrezvychaynoe polozhenie) in order to ensure
citizens’ safety and to protect the constitutional order. The state of emergency is
declared by the President and his decree has to be approved within 48 hours by
the Council of the Federation, the upper chamber of the Parliament. The 2001 State
of Emergency Organic Act gives effect to the constitutional provisions and lists the
rights which are restricted and to which extent. Importantly, in state of emergency
the existing civilian administration is replaced by military administration, though
parliament continues to operate.
The 2001 State of Emergency Organic Act was a product of careful drafting and
long political deliberation, so however severe the limitations on rights may be (e.g.
police may detain those in violation of curfew for up to 30 days without any court
order), they have the restrictions and the procedures in the state of emergency
have the benefit of being clearly defined. Despite the calls to introduce the state of
emergency, the 2001 Act was never invoked, not least because its provisions carried
certainty.
The 1994 Emergency Situations Act was intended to deal with the natural and man-
made disasters. However serious the damage may be, disaster usually concern a
limited territory: an earthquake or a natural gas explosion on the island of Sakhalin
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does not affect Novosibirsk or Oryol. So regional governors and even mayors were
given powers to declare situations of emergency (chrezvychaynaya situatsiya), as
opposed to state of emergency, and to mobilise police and Emercom units. The
1994 Act did not allow for enacting limitations on human rights except for barring
access inside the designated perimeters. This restriction appeared relevant: it is
arguably reasonable that the emergency services in charge, for example, of clearing
earthquake debris and looking for survivors and bodies deny access to the site to
strangers.
The most relevant to epidemics and pandemics, however, was the 1999 Sanitary
and Epidemiological Well-Being Act. Its article 41 provided for a regime of quarantine
which could be enacted by the executive on advice of a regional or the federal
Chief Sanitary Physician (at the federal level s/he is an ex officio deputy Minister
of Health). While quarantine allowed to close borders, the regime was otherwise
designed to quarantine specific buildings, like schools or kindergartens.
All three pieces of legislation had in common not only the possibility to limit human
rights, but other features as well. All three provided for compensation to be paid for
the damage to individuals, even if lawfully caused. The compensation was capped
at token levels: for example, the regulations adopted under the 1994 Emergency
Situations Act provided for only 10,000-ruble (approx. EUR120) payments for
everything other than death and destruction of property.
Since January 2020 the Russian Government was busy preparing a constitutional
reform the contents of which was not immediately clear. Announced in the State
of the Nation address, it would redistribute some insignificant powers between the
legislature and the executive, repeal the primacy of international law but not quite,
introduce God somewhere among the rules governing federalism, and provide
for the annual increase of old-age pension, a principle already well-established
in the legislation which, ironically or not, also provides for a gradual increase in
the retirement age since 2018. The jewel in the constitutional reformers’ crown
was presented to the public considerably later, on 10 March 2020, when the State
Duma deputy Valentina Tereshkova, first woman in space in 1965, proposed to
allow Vladimir Putin to run in 2024 for the first presidential term. His fourth term as
President, running since 2018, would be considered “term zero” according to her
hastily adopted amendment, hence “zeroisation”.
As many European countries were entering Covid-19 lockdowns, on 17 March 2020
Vladimir Putin announced an all-Russian vote on the constitutional draft. Chapter
9 of the 1993 Constitution governing constitutional amendments did not allow or
provide for such vote or referendum of any kind, but the date was set for 22 April,
ironically or not, the 150th anniversary of Vladimir Lenin.
The need to obtain a popular acclamation for the “zeroisation” of Mr Putin’s
presidential terms delayed the initial response at the federal level. On 25 March
2020, when it was no longer possible for the federal authorities not to act, a
presidential decree declared a week of “non-working days” (nerabochie dni) at the
employers’ expense until 3 April; “non-working days” were later extended by the
President until 12 May. These presidential decrees caused multiple controversies:
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civil, labour, procedural and all other legislation only distinguished between “working
days” (rabochie dni) and “days off” (vykhodnye dni). The decrees created a lot of
confusion, for example, as to how time-limits were to be counted, and the Supreme
Court’s public explanations were ambiguous.
While federal response to the pandemic was delayed, regional authorities started
acting on their own. The informal leader was the Moscow Mayor who already on
5 March first introduced controls like self-isolation for international arrivals and
for those over 65. Moscow Mayor referred to a provision in the 1994 Emergency
Situations Act on “high alert preceding a situation of emergency”, designed to allow
authorities to act when they receive information on a forthcoming earthquake, e.g. to
mobilise the law-enforcement, but not restrict rights. “High alert” also did not require
any compensatory payments be dispensed by the authorities.
Moscow Mayor’s decree of 5 March was then amended or completely re-written
on no less than 15 occasions, imposing a regime of lockdown, closing schools
and universities, prohibiting all kinds of public events, and introducing, between 15
April and 9 June, a system of electronic permits to move around the city. This was
made possible because of an amendment to the 1994 Emergency Situations Act
allowing regional governors to restrict human rights during “high alert”. All regional
governors followed the Mayor of Moscow introducing different kinds of restrictions,
their regulations never having been coordinated one with another. Getting from
Vologda to Voronezh, a 1000km ride, would require conforming to 8 different sets of
regional regulations.
The Federal Cabinet would take action by ordinances (rasporyazhenie) which did
not require publication and had been designed to be individual acts, rather than by
decrees (postanovlenie) of general application that would require publication. The
Cabinet closed the Russian land borders under the 1999 legislative provisions on
quarantine, but the mandatory advice of the Chief Sanitary Physician was never
made public. While the airports were not closed entirely, all international flights were
suspended sine die by a press-release of Rosaviatsiya, the civil aviation authority;
no ordinances or regulations have ever been enacted. Because the border-related
ordinances of the Federal Cabinet were first enacted and only then made public, a
lot of travellers on arrival faced requirements unknown to them on departure. The
first version of the ordinance was also so restrictive that only Russian nationals
could enter, even permanent residents with family members in Russia were turned at
border checkpoints. It took the Cabinet a week to amend the ordinance, but this time
the provisions favourable to individuals did not start to apply before the publication
which took another couple of days (meaning two additional nights of sleep in an
international zone of airports for many).
Russian authorities’ response to the Covid-19 pandemic was characterised by
initial denial in the hope to proceed with the constitutional “zeroisation” of Putin’s
presidential terms. Otherwise, they tried to balance the need to enact restrictions to
combat the spread of the virus with the need to avoid any compensatory payments
to the population, at least those payments that were provided for in the legislation as
a matter of right. As a matter of discretion, some public money was distributed, e.g.,
parents were paid just under EUR 200 per minor child, the self-employed received
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the taxes they paid in 2019 and the like. For the most part, though, the Russians
were not offered financial incentive to stay at home, they went to work relatively early
and so did the virus.
Thou Shalt Be Fined, But Manually
The “high alert” regime resulted in the multiple restrictions on freedom of movement
and freedom of assembly. Initially intended to last just a few days, at of January
2021 it has effectively lasted for 10 months and still covers virtually the whole
country. Applications for judicial review of gubernatorial decrees were brought in
many regions, but whatever the applicants’ submissions were the judges dismissed
all of them. They rather stereotypically referred to the amended 1994 Emergency
Situations Act to say that if enacting restrictions on rights was allowed, all restrictions
were legitimate. Only a judge of the Sverdlovsk Regional Court in Yekaterinburg
added a somewhat creative explanation having said that if he had to remedy
real and tangible violations of the applicants’ rights he would have granted the
application, but he was faced with a claim brought by those who just refused to
stay at home for the public good. Appeals were heard and dismissed by the newly
created appeal courts, the judges of which can now be removed by the President
and the Council of the Federation under the 2020 constitutional amendments. In
the final days of 2020 the Constitutional Court, also weakened by the reform it had
itself validated (its judges can now also be dismissed and they were reduced from 19
to 11), upheld the regional restrictions on the freedom of movement which it would
unconditionally strike down for the preceding quarter of a century.
The anti-Covid-19 response by the Russian regional governors included a total
ban on “mass events”, which covered both concerts and demonstrations. Mass
marches in Khabarovsk protesting against the removal of the elected governor
were tolerated because of the police’s inability to disperse tens of thousands of
protestors, but elsewhere even solo demonstrators were treated as organisers of
“mass events”, fined and imprisoned. Justifying the fines and arrests of protesters,
Russian Ministry of Justice issued a press-release saying that all Russian measures
were in conformity with what EU democracies were doing. The press-release
blatantly disregarded multiple court decisions in Europe upholding the freedom of
assembly even in the times of pandemic, leaving open the question as to whether
the Ministry itself complied with the Russian fake news ban.
Probably because the authorities themselves were not entirely sincere throughout
the pandemic, the enforcement of the fake news legislation fared somewhat
differently. New administrative and criminal offences were introduced in April 2020 to
fine and imprison those who disseminated “fake news” about the pandemic, however
ironic it seemed in the situation where the authorities themselves denied emergency.
Convictions were entered for social media posts questioning the authorities’
response to the pandemic and to the deficit of protective gear in hospitals. However,
in approximately two thirds of the cases the charges were dropped, even if on formal
grounds.
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During the pandemic the Moscow City authorities experimented with IT-surveillance.
Those under quarantine and self-isolation (e.g., those who suffered from Covid-19
and their family members) were forced to install a “Social Monitoring” application
on their cell phones and to send selfies in home interior within 5 minutes of random
requests by the app. Failure to send a selfie was regarded as a breach of self-
isolation or quarantine and resulted in an automatically imposed fine of 5,000 rubles
(approx. EUR 58). Hundreds of such fines were appealed and quashed on the
grounds that the federal legislation did not itself allow automatic imposition of fines
in public health cases and also did not allow the regions to expand the recourse to
automatically imposed fines.
Tiny possibilities to challenge the new restrictive measures, like automated “Social
Monitoring” fines and fake news charges, left by the courts were almost entirely
forgotten when in the final days of 2020 the State Duma hastily adopted new
legislation extending the notions of “foreign agent” individuals and the Ministry of
Justice designated first five individual “foreign agents” under the existing legislation.
Among them are a former Soviet dissident, a modern artist, and three journalists.
Several new groups, this time those working with HIV-positive persons and with
victims of domestic violence, were added to the NGO “foreign agent” register.
Russian Government comes out of the pandemic year strengthened in its
unchallenged authority.  The constitutional reform ensures that the President is not
replaced for over another decade. Authorities have shown that they were ready
to sacrifice lives in order to keep the coffers closed. The pandemic became a
convenient reason to prohibit assemblies, enhance surveillance, prosecution for
speech on social media and for independent not-for-profit activity. It will so continue
until it is no more.
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